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Abstract
The world sectarianism is derived from “sect”, which means body of
people having varied views within same religion. Since last three
decades, sectarianism is damaging the state as well as the society of
Pakistan. It has become a peril to the stability of the country. The Ahmadi
community, accepted as a minority sect of Islam at the time of the
country’s independence, became the first minority group to be targeted
for sectarian violence in 1953. Sectarian violence was rife in Pakistan
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Besides, on the downhill, the present
decade is experiencing continuation of sectarian skirmishes in various
pockets of Pakistan – Karachi, Kurram, Jhang, Quetta etc. Religious
scholars, lawyers, doctors, government officials, educationist, other
professionals, shopkeepers, students, and vendors, all have been targeted
in one way or the other due to sectarian differences. The ongoing
sectarian skirmish is dividing the already divided population of Pakistan
with dangerous ramification. It can be rightly put into writing that
common people of Pakistan are living in fear, since last few decades
sectarian conflicts have amplified assassination, suicide bombings, bomb
blasts, and numerous terrorist attacks.
Key words: Pakistan, Sectarianism, violence, Karachi, Kurram, Jhang,
Quetta
Introduction
Pakistan, a country with a rich diversity of people, culture and languages,
though multi-cultural to its very core, is however increasingly plagued as a
society, by sectarian conflict causing insurmountable rage and violence. The
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combination of lack of representation, poor governance, institutionalised
corruption and economic stagnation are compelling ingredients for societal
breakdown and disillusionment. The unemployed youth of Pakistan, who see
little hope in traditional politics or the way of governance, are fascinated by the
missionary zeal of the religious right wing. The rapid growth of Islamic militancy
in Pakistan may be a consequence of poor governance and economic stagnation,
and in no small measure due to the failure of the international financial
institutions to provide firm and consistent support to a Pakistan, geared towards
human development, rather than the mere avoidance of loan defaults.1
Not only the common people of the country, but even the Police and Military
establishments have been victims of the deadliest attacks. In terms of sectarian
violence, the Shias and the Sunnis have been massacred in the ongoing conflicts.
The Shia Muslims face the major brunt from target killing to bombings in various
parts of the country. Conflicts occur between Shia and Sunni on one hand, and
on the other among the various Sunni sects. These conflicts often characterized
politically, are basically an expression of a deeper philosophical confusion as to
what constitutes an Islamic state.2
Sectarianism in Pakistan
The concept of sectarianism is based on the exclusivist group identity of a
religious body that can be classified as a political or military unit. This group
identity is imbued with a negative attitude towards its environment, often leading
to political and social action in the form of condemnation of, and discrimination
or even violence, in contrast to those outside one’s community.3 The word
sectarianism is derived from sect, which means body of people having varied
views within the same religion. Sectarianism means observance of the rules of
a particular sect or party, especially in a bigoted or narrow-minded way. In
sociological studies sect is part of a religious study; which means a group split
from the mainstream religion on the grounds of doctrine.4
Pakistan is confronted with two broad categories of conflicts, namely internal
and external which can be still further classified. It is facing the twin menaces
of religious extremism and ethnic strife. The real threat to the security primarily
comes from “within.” The internal terror is caused by banned organisations
with strong ethnic and sectarian bias. Areas like, Kurram, Parachinar, Dera Ismail
Khan, tribal belt and Southern Punjab are severely affected.5 Pakistan is
experiencing a sharp escalation in sectarian violence, especially with the rise of
Pakistan Taliban in the mid 2000s. Most recurrently, such ferocity involves
clashes between members of the Sunni and the Shia communities. But violent
incidents between the Deobandi and Barelvi sub-sects6 of Sunni Islam are also
89
on a rise. Besides, various Sufi shrines have also been subject to such violent
attacks in Pakistan. The role played by Sufi saints in shaping the intrinsic nature
of the Islam religion in the Indian sub-continent can never be denied. Pakistan,
being part of this larger area, also exhibits a dominant Sufi history, which is
unfortunately, undermined by the ‘mainstream’ version of Wahhabi Islam.
Since the last three decades, sectarianism is damaging the state as well as
the society of Pakistan. It has become a very serious peril to the stability of
Pakistan. Its negative effects are destroying the society on many fronts i.e.
economically, psychologically, politically and socially.7 The sectarian conict
has caused tensions in the southern part of Punjab, Balochistan and also in the
urban centres of Karachi and Quetta. The politics of sectarian exclusiveness is
becoming mainstream in Pakistan. Rampant violence and killing in the name
of diverse religious sects has become a somewhat ongoing trend.8 The state has
also somehow failed to provide basic safety to its citizens, in terms of conviction
of sectarian murders and policy initiatives. No measures were being taken to
curb the tide of increasing violence and bloodshed.9
Overview
The Shias, who form a minority sect in Pakistan have been worried with
religious discrimination even before Pakistan came into existence as a separate
state. In fact, immediately after the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which set the
ground for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent, Shia leaders
had asked Muhammad Ali Jinnah for the provision of safeguards for the safety
and protection of religious rights of their community in the future Pakistan.10
The Ahmadi community, accepted as a minority sect of Islam at the time of
the country’s independence, became the first minority group to be targeted for
sectarian violence when anti-Ahmadi riots broke out in 1953 in Lahore, leading
to the first imposition of Martial Law in the country’s history, limited to Lahore.
With Shias also facing resistance from increasingly vocal Sunni conser-
vatives, two Shia organisations, one a successor to the All Parties Shia Conference
(APSC), established soon after 1947 and Idara-e-Tahafuz-e-Haquq-e-Shia
(ITHS), established in 1953, became more relevant. Shia landlords in Sindh
and Punjab, industrialists from Karachi, and wealthy trading families in Lahore
financed both organisations. In 1957, ulema in the two organisations jointly
adopted a resolution to demand reserved seats for Shias in national and provincial
legislatures. However, the proposal did not receive much support.11
The Ayub era witnessed a shifting dynamic in Shia-Sunni relations. In 1963,
Sunni extremists killed more than a hundred Shias in two attacks, one of which
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was on a Muharram procession. Government placed restrictions on more
processions and persuaded the Shias to limit their Muharram procession routes.
This had a major impact on Shia thinking and, accordingly, on the community’s
organisational politics. Nevertheless, to calm Shia fears, the Ayub Government
constituted a government board to consider Shia demands and submit recommen-
dations. The formation of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto also received a lot of support from the Shia community, as Bhutto was a
Shia. The advent of the Imamia Students Organisation (ISO) in May 1972,
marked a turning point for the mobilisation of the Shia youth of Pakistan and
ultimately led, in some instances, to militancy.12
Sectarian violence was rife in Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. General
Zia ul-Haq’s (governed 1977-1988) policies and legislation aimed at ‘Islamising’
Pakistan and were formulated in accordance with an orthodox version of the
principles of Sunni Islam, to the exclusion of Sunni Barelvis and Shia Muslims.
For example, in 1980 Zia imposed a zakat (wealth tax) and ushr (farming tax)
ordinance that contradicted Shia practice and mobilised Pakistan’s Shia
population for the first time: 100,000 Shias marched on the federal secretariat
in Islamabad, forcing the general to repeal the ordinance as it pertained to Shias,
but also provoking the ire of hard-line Sunni organizations.13 The march of
thousands of Shias on the streets of Islamabad was threatening enough to secure
exemption for Shias from paying zakat and the agreement to this effect between
Mahmood Haroon, the then Minister for Religious Affairs and Mufti Jafar
Hussain, which came to be known as the Islamabad Agreement.14
Concerned by the Shia rebellion aka show of force, Sunni groups used this
Shia refusal to pay an Islamic tax as a chance to brand them as apostates and
heretics, a dangerous narrative that still persists among extremist Deobandi Sunni
groups.15 Jaafar Hussain, argued that if Pakistan was to have Islamic law, the
Shia should be allowed to follow their own jurisprudence- Jaaafariya Fiqh
(Jurisprudence), after the sixth Shia Imam Jafar al-Sadiq.16 This victory, though
welcomed by Shia moderates and Pakistani liberals, riled many extremists of
both sects- among Shias those who believed in the Islamic revolution, and among
Sunnis those who were worried of the newfound Shia assertiveness and wanted
Pakistan to be a Sunni state.17
Zia had already become very unpopular with many Shia Muslims for the
execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was a Shia, and also for his promulgation
of Islamic laws based solely on the teachings of the Hanafi Sunni sect.18 Hanafi
Fiqh is the most practicing religious vogue descended from the Hanafi School
of Thought, and followed by the Sunni population only. The enactment of the
Hanafi Fiqh was reprimanded by many Shia scholars during the time of Zia,
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and though not riotous at that time, this practice nevertheless ripped the social
unity of the two ethnic groups as time passed on.19
Since the late 1980s, Shias belonging to all walks of life and all ethnic
backgrounds have been targeted and killed in every possible way, at every
possible place and area in Pakistan.20 Depending upon their political and/or
social standing, different Shia groups responded to these difficult conditions in
differing ways. Many elite and politically-connected Shias opted to stay publicly
silent in order to hold on to their access to the corridors of power, whereas their
religious institutions started drifting towards financially advantageous relations
with Iran. A minority of the Shia groups took up arms to defend the community
and got involved in tit-for-tat terror attacks against Sunni groups involved in
the developing sectarian conflict. In the process, Pakistan became a battleground
for a proxy Saudi-Iran war in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The rise
of the Taliban in Afghanistan after 1994 provided a safe haven for the anti-Shia
militants while Islamabad merely observed as the country became engulfed and
enflamed in sectarianism. The September 11 attacks temporarily led to an
improvement of the situation for the Shias. In the aftermath of the attacks,
Pakistan’s then-President, General Pervez Musharraf, began his counterterrorism
efforts by banning sectarian militant groups of both the Shia and Sunni
orientation.21 However, not much success was met by this government’s efforts.
As evaluated by Moonis Ahmar, the pattern of overall sectarian conflict in
Pakistan from 1980 onwards can be broadly divided into four phases. 1985-
1995 was characterized by target killing; The mid-90s was mainly dominated
by use of hand grenades and time bombs; and from 1997 onwards, the pattern
changed to indiscriminate gunfire on citizens and revenge killings of
professionals; post 9/11 the element of suicide attacks has been included in the
modus operandi of sectarian outfits.22
Besides, on the downhill, the present decade is experiencing a continuation
of the sectarian skirmishes in various pockets of Pakistan - Karachi, Kurram,
Jhang, Quetta etc. Religious scholars, lawyers, doctors, government officials,
educationists, other professionals, shopkeepers, students, and vendors, all have
been targeted in one way or the other for the mere reason of them being Shia.
Shias have been attacked in religious processions, they have been dragged off
the buses, separated and slaughtered; they have been targeted on their way to
pilgrimage; they have been subject to attacks on their way to schools or
workplaces, they have been gunned down while offering prayers and they have
been attacked while performing their regular day-to-day business.23
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Reasons for the Conflict
The studies of sectarian conflict in Pakistan have focused extensively on
macro level phenomena such as Zia’s islamisation, the Iranian Revolution, the
Iran-Iraq war and finally, the Afghan jihad as determining factors in the Shia-
Sunni conflict. Although extremely significant in explaining the external
influences fuelling the conflict, these analyses leave much to be desired towards
understanding the local dynamics of the conflict.
Sectarian groups are always attached to a religious treatise. Due to the
narrow-mindedness of religious leaders, the level of bigotry and fanaticism
among religious groups in the Pakistani society is slowly mounting. The ongoing
impasse in the country is related to the fact that religious intolerance and
extremism have obtained militant connotations. Bitter hatred towards members
of diverse sects is not only addressed but also overrated. Thus, it has endangered
the peace and security of the country.24
It is true that religious segregation and exclusion play a significant role in
sectarian violence but the power struggle, political climate, economic gains,
and the cultural climate are also key factors that lead to sectarianism. In case of
Pakistan, sectarianism had underlying political motives; even the perpetrators
mostly used religious tactics to appeal to the people. Contradictorily, Pakistan
undoubtedly blames Iran and Saudi Arabia for the sectarian strife since both the
countries have funded and trained the people of their side. There are many
internal dynamics of sectarian conflicts along with external that need to be
understood. For example, the corrupting value system, intolerance towards the
differing sects, mal governance and power politics both at local and national
level, all of which plays a vital part in sectarian divide.25
It has been argued on various platforms, that sectarian outfits and clerics
associated with sectarian mosques are often able to fill a void left by an absentee
state and local elite bent on preserving inequality. This may mostly be the case
in urbanizing districts in the country. Run-down governance and scarce social
services are contributing to the spread of extremism, as extremist groups fill the
political vacuum by providing services such as education and natural disaster
relief and rehabilitation. The influence of pre-existing local power brokers, such
as the landed elite, is being challenged by sectarian clerics, often associated
with the militant sectarian outfits operating with their unchallenged impunity.26
The upsurge of sectarian conflict is also closely linked to religious education
in Pakistan. Religious seminaries in Pakistan operate on a strictly sectarian basis
and continue to impart education along the sectarian lines. Madrasas make the
main constituencies of religious political parties, jihadi groups and sectarian
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militant organizations, who look towards the institutions for expanding their
respective support bases. Madrasas have thus had a great impact on the forte
and salient rise of sectarian organizations and Islamic parties in Pakistan.27
From the point of view of resource management, the case of the Shia-Sunni
conflict can be identified as a clash of material interests but the roots of the
conflict evade socio-economic explanations. The prevailing socio-economic
scenario can either worsen or contain violence between the members of the two
sects in various contexts but the fundamental underlying antagonism remains.
One of the most common indicators of this fact is the active use of religious
interpretations to disclose schisms or boundaries by declaring the differing sect
as ‘beyond the pale’ of Islam. Thus, by dehumanising the opposing sect to the
status of the ‘other’ or ‘infidel’, violence can be perpetrated against it.28
The ongoing sectarian skirmish is dividing the already divided population
of Pakistan with resulting dangerous ramifications. The society of Pakistan
exemplifies the country’s trend of showcasing the vulgarity of hatred for a fellow
human being at the basic level and countrymen in general. In the ongoing
scenario, hate and apathy are more profound than human consciousness. The
country is facing a serious humanitarian crisis in which a fellow Muslim is
willing to cause harm to another, on the basis of difference in religious doctrines.
Among various other ills like, ethnic conflict, gender violence, terror attacks
etc., sectarian divide has also become a defining and deciding factor for Pakistan’s
society and polity.
Epicenters of Sectarian Conflict
Realm of Violence – Karachi: Karachi, which is also known as a ‘Mini-
Pakistan’ is a vibrant city; also one of the most dangerous cities in the world,
with rapid gun-crime, sky-high homicide rates and growing sectarian conflict
for both Shias and Sunnis. The metropolis is also a den for notorious armed
groups, further providing a specific character29 to the violence. Sectarian target
killing in Karachi often results in revengeful violent acts, causing a never-ending
spree of death, adding to the volatile dynamics of the city.
Though most accounts of Pakistan’s first episode of sectarian conflict,
targeting the Ahmadis in the 1950s, generally focus on Punjab, Karachi was not
immune to this movement. In 1952, riots broke out after the Karachi Ahmadiya
Association tried to hold its yearly convention in Jahangir Park. Thousands of
assailants looted and ransacked Ahmadi business establishments and properties
in central Karachi. Following these violent incidents, Ulama called for the
government to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Also, few incidents of anti-
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Shia violence were recorded in the late 1970s in Ali Basti and Old Golimar
areas of the city.30
If the turf war in Karachi had remained limited to Mohajirs and non-
Mohajirs, it would have died a natural death. But, Zia in his ‘islamisation’
initiative drove a wedge between the two sects. As a result, Karachi became
one of the most prominent focal points of sectarian violence. Also, the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), lent a helping hand to the Sunnis by setting up an
organisation, Sawad-e-Azam, headquartered in Karachi. It was the precursor to
the creation of Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba, later re-christened as Sipah-e-Sahaba
of Pakistan (SSP), under Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Moreover, the funding received
by the madrasas during Zia rule, also enhanced the sectarian fervour in the city.
One of the biggest madrasas in Karachi is the Jamiat-ul-Ulum ul-Islamia in the
Binori town of the city. It has been one of the prominent recruitments and training
grounds for the cadres and leadership of SSP.31 The relocation of large numbers
of Deobandi Ulama from North India to Karachi after Partition, as well as the
Pashtun migration to the city contributed to making Karachi a stronghold of
Deobandi clerics. From the 1980s, Binori town has been in the forefront of the
sectarian conflict. In 1986, one of its founders Mufti Wali Hasan Tonki issued a
fatwa of apostasisation against Shias, arguing that they were outside Islam.32
Much later in 1990, a new sectarian group called as the Sunni Tehrik
(movement) was established in Karachi under the leadership of Maulana Saleem
Qadri. It needs to be mentioned that in a deadly suicide attack in Karachi, in a
religious gathering organised by the Sunni Tehrik on April 11, 2006, its entire
leadership was wiped out.33 The Tehrik has often used its strong-arm tactics to
protect the interests of the Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jama’at (Barelvis) against rival
Sunni sects (Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Salafis). Interestingly, the militant
stand of the Tehrik against Saudi-backed groups seems to have earned it the
financial support from Iran, causing its turf war with SSP and JuD.34
The more recent patterns of sectarian violence are very different from the
original Shia-Sunni violence that occurred until the 1980s, when rival religious
processions could break out into mob attacks and riots. Law-enforcement
agencies in the city have identified a number of “sensitive areas” as part of their
plan to deal with sectarian violence that keeps flaring up in the city every now
and then. They have tagged the Shia-dominated Malir, Ancholi, Jafar-e-Tayyar
Society, Numaish and Rizvia Society as areas from where law enforcers expect
a reaction if and when a Shia is killed anywhere in the city. Sunni sectarian
groups have strong-holds in areas such as Banaras, Nagan Chowrangi,
Quaidabad, Patel Para and Tawheed Chowk. The security officials see strong
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footprints of Sunni groups such as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), formerly-
SSP, in all these neighbourhoods.35
But, over a period of time, due to various operations conducted by security
agencies, the city is supposedly seeing less and less of sectarian conflicts.
Sectarian violence has decreased to a great extent because of the ongoing
successful operation against banned sectarian groups in the city. As a result,
2018 was more or less peaceful. Lately, it has also been said that Karachi has
been ‘omitted’ from the list of flashpoints of sectarian violence; nonetheless,
according to latest reports, there have been some instances of such violence
occurring in the city in this phase of 2019.36
The Restive Arena – Quetta: In the restive province of Balochistan, amidst
a state of lawlessness and led by the Deobandi madrassa network, radicalisation
is on the upsurge and sectarian groups have stepped up their activities in the
region. The number of sectarian killings has amplified almost exponentially
over the past few years in the province. Balochistan is increasingly becoming a
nexus for sectarian outfits now. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, SSP, al-Qaeda,
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), ISO, and Sipah-e-Muhammed Pakistan (SMP) are said
to have established their respective strongholds in the province. Their presence
is the result of Pakistani security agencies pushing them there from Punjab,
partly a result of a vast network of Deobandi madrasas; as a result of the
islamisation policies pursued by the federal state since the 1970s; and also due
to the Afghan refugee camps in the province acting as a main source of recruits
for the Taliban.37
Quetta, the capital city, also experiences sectarian killings meted out to the
minority Hazara Shia38 community by various Sunni militant groups. Quetta
has become a battlefield or a violent pit of vengeance for the minority Hazaras.
In a way, the city has taken the shape of a Hazara graveyard. Most Hazaras
reside in this resource rich province. The rampant attacks on these individuals
often leave them in a perpetual state of terror and insecurity even within their
own Hazara neighbourhood. Attacks against the Hazara community are getting
more rampant and worse, with more and more people dying everyday.
Ethnically Mongolian, Hazaras are easily identifiable from the rest of the
population. Therefore, ultimately, no place is safe for them. Even if they stay
within the confines of the community, entire communities have been bombed
by Sunni extremist groups. With a population of about 600,000 in Quetta, the
community, whose physical appearance make them easy targets, has been
targeted in a sustained campaign of murders and bombings that has claimed at
least 509 lives since 2013, according to Pakistan’s National Commission for
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Human Rights (NCHR).39 Moreover, people of the community are getting
increasingly more alienated due to the Government’s neglect and apathy towards
them. Recent Hazara killings in Pakistan started with the attack on Provincial
Education Minister, Nisar Ali Hazara, on October 6, 1999, and has accelerated
with time since then.
The relative success of Hazaras, both in business and education is also
another reason for jealousy and hatred among the other dissatisfied groups in
the province, who hold the Hazaras a culprit, responsible for their miseries.
The Hazaras have become an urban elite in a typically impoverished Balochistan
where per capita, neither the Pashtun nor the Baloch can match the Hazara
accomplishment. Needless to say, that their success has been achieved through
hard work and not at the cost of others.40
Community leaders say they see little interest from the government in
bringing an end to the killings. “If there was an earnest effort to target these
groups, I do not think that the area of Quetta could not be kept secure,” says
community leader Dawood Agha. “If terrorist acts are still happening, then it
seems that the government is not interested in acting against the attackers”, he
added. The government has taken strict security measures in the two main
residential neighbourhoods – Marriabad and Hazara Town, where the community
resides. The neighbourhoods are surrounded by high concrete walls topped with
barbed wire. Entry is strictly controlled. By 8 pm, there is a virtual curfew with
all entrances and exits sealed, bar one at each enclave. “We have been imprisoned
without having committed a crime,” states Agha.41
The persecution of Hazaras is not a new phenomenon. Hazaras are
historically, residents of Afghanistan, and almost all Hazaras belong to the Shia
community. Lately, the Hazaras are finding themselves at the centre of an
extremely volatile region, where the extremist Taliban and other fundamentalist
sectarian terrorist groups like LeJ and SSP were already quite active. Hazaras
have also been a target of ethnic cleansing, targeted killing and genocide in
Afghanistan. The Afshar Operation, Mazar-i-Sharif massacre, the Rohatak Pass
massacre and the Yakawlang massacre of Hazara community in Afghanistan
can be considered as just the tip of an ice-berg. Theories suggest the persecution
of the Hazaras in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan are a continuance of
these extremist sentiments, given that LeJ, the group claiming responsibility
for most of the attacks on Hazara community, has had strong ties with al-Qaeda.
Moreover LeJ, though considered a terrorist organisation by the Pakistan and
U.S. governments, is believed to have some backing among right-wing political
parties in Pakistan. The backing may also encompass Pakistan’s military, which
is to a certain degree busy with its own clandestine operations in Balochistan.42
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Since the 1990s, as the Taliban phenomenon gained ascendancy in
Afghanistan, the Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan has intensified. As the Taliban
consolidated power in Afghanistan, Balochistan, with its provincial capital
Quetta, became part of a security and economic corridor that bound it to the
city of Kandahar, which emerged as the headquarters of the Afghan Taliban. In
addition to Taliban influence, the LeJ, have been vocal in their anti-Shia stance.
Since the late 1990s, the Hazaras have been subjected to a growing number of
attacks from religious armed groups in Pakistan, primarily the LeJ.43
The LeJ was formed by Riaz Basra, along with Akram Lahori and Malik
Ishaque, as a radical off-shoot of SSP in 1996. The LeJ, a part of a much wider
Deobandi movement, aims to transform Pakistan into a Sunni state primarily
through violent means. It has links with militant outfits like, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen (HuM) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) as well as with the Taliban
and al Qaeda. It is perhaps a result of the Taliban-LeJ collaborative network,
that the killings of the Shias in Quetta, after 2001, have taken on an increased
impetus.44
Since 2012, Quetta’s Hazaras have been compelled to limit their activities
to the Hazara-dominated neighbourhoods of Marriabad and Hazara Town. As a
result, they have started facing increasing economic hardships, very little safe
access to education, and severe limits imposed on their freedom of movement.45
Valley of Death – Parachinar: Parachinar, located in the western flung of
Pakistan, is also called “Little Iran”. The majority of the town’s residents are
ethnic Pashtuns who belong to the Shia sect. Shia dominated Parachinar in the
Upper Kurram Agency remains a principal target for Sunni sectarian terrorist
formations. Built by the British Royal Army in the 1890s, the town is the
headquarters of the Kurram Agency, housing offices of the political admini-
stration, units of the Army and Frontier Corps. Some 58 per cent of its population
is Sunni, and 42 per cent Shia (according to the 1998 Census). The majority of
Shias live in Upper Kurram, while Sunnis dominate Lower and Central Kurram.46
The present cycle of escalation started when three people were killed and
13 others were injured in an attack on a Shia Imambargah on the morning of
April 6, 2007. Clashes in Kurram from November 2007 to 2010 left over 3,000
people dead, while thousands of families were forced to flee their homes. Unlike
other tribal agencies of erstwhile FATA, the dynamics in Kurram are different
because of the sectarian divide and the geo-strategic location of the Agency.
Kurram is surrounded by Afghanistan from three sides and has remained in
turmoil since 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It shares the major
portion of its borders with the troubled Logar, Paktia, Khost and Nangarhar
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Provinces of Afghanistan. The al Qaeda and Taliban infested Tora Bora Mountain
range in the Nangarhar Province shares its boundaries with the Kurram Agency.
The Agency also connects the tribal areas of Pakistan to Afghanistan through
lower, central and upper Kurram. Crucially, the Thal-Parachinar route is the
shortest route to Kabul from Peshawar.47 Upper Kurram is inhabited largely by
Turis,48 who belong to the only Pashtun tribe, which is wholly Shia, while Lower
Kurram is inhabited by Sunnis, mostly Bangash. There are longstanding disputes
over ownership of forests, hills, land and water resources between the Sunni
and Shia tribes and sporadic incidents of communal violence have taken place
since the 1930s. But, it was the massive influx of Afghan refugees in the 1980s
that caused a distortion in the demographic and religious balance of the area.
The first large scale attack took place in 1986 when the Turis prevented Sunni
Mujahideen from passing through to Afghanistan. General Zia ul Haq allowed
a “purge” of the Turis at the hands of the Afghan Mujahideen in conjunction
with the local Sunni population.49
Muharram in Parachinar has not been a peaceful event since decades. When
sectarian conflict was unheard of in other parts of Pakistan, it was rampant in
Kurram Agency. This is of course before the advent of the SSP, LeJ and SMP.
Crucially, tribes are divided along sectarian lines. Nevertheless, while minor
sectarian conflicts have been a routine in each Muharram, Parachinar has seen
various changes to its society over the years. In 1982, 1996 and 2007, major
sectarian clashes erupted in Kurram Agency, with Parachinar emerging as the
epicentre of the violence. In fact, the year 2007 is a significant one in Parachinar’s
history. It is the same year when the TTP was formed. But even before, in 2006,
the Taliban had penetrated the Sunni areas of central and lower Kurram.50
The pre-2007 clashes also witnessed the local tribes, led by local leaders
trying to sort out problems and reach a ceasefire amongst themselves.
Unvaryingly, this peace would last for the next ten years, as has been the case
since the 1970s. The situation has changed in terms of sectarian violence. Ferocity
in Parachinar is no more led by the local tribes, and hence, hereafter cannot be
settled through local leaders. The entry of militants from outside has altered the
condition and also the sectarian equilibrium against the Turi Shias of Kurram.
The local Sunni tribes are now armed with Sunni militants of Pakistan and
across the Durand Line by the Haqqani group.51
The Shias have been targeted in the Kurram, through targeted killings and
economic blockade by the Taliban. They maintain that, because they are stopping
the militants from entering Afghanistan, the Taliban are attacking them, while
the Sunni groups assert that Iran has provided weapons to Shias in the area.52
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The well-known “war” of 2007 to 2010 left over 3,000 people dead and caused
thousands of families to flee their homes. It was trailed by a period of relative
peace, but in fact the violence and turbulence never entirely abated and now
there are signs of serious resurgence, including major targeted attacks against
Shias. There is little doubt now that the signs of escalating sectarian violence in
Kurram are now being realised. Threats originating across the border in
Afghanistan are a very noteworthy reason. The Pakistan Government seems to
be unable to deal effectively with this situation at this time.53
While there was a noticeable trend of reduction of sectarian violence in
Pakistan over the past few years, Parachinar has been facing the burden of attacks
even during this seemingly non-violent period. While Parachinar’s Shia populace
has been warned against any involvement in the Syrian conflict, locals have
denied any involvement suggesting that the accusations are an attempt at
guaranteeing “sectarian cleansing” in a strategically located area.54
Rustic Skirmish – Jhang: If Pakistan, must be broken from within by
Islamist forces, then the process would start in the belt between Jhang and
Bahawalpur, with the ancient city of Multan, at its heart. A certain latent tension
between the two sectarian communities has existed in the region for long time.
The prevalence of Shia Islam in Jhang and adjoining areas can be traced back to
the Abbasid period. Omar bin Hafas, the governor of Jhang was a clandestine
supporter of the Fatimid Shias of Persia. He was influential in spreading Shia
influence in the areas of Sindh and Shorkot, the latter now a Tehsil (subdivision)
of the Jhang District. After Hafas, an Ismaili Shia dynasty called the Carmathians
set up their government in Multan. It was during this period that the Shia sectarian
identity became strongly entrenched in major parts of Southern Punjab including
Jhang.55 After taking over Multan, Mahmud of Ghazni replaced the Shia
Carmathian prince with a Sunni ruler. This was the earliest Shia-Sunni conflict
in the Southern Punjab region of the subcontinent. The Sunni government in
Multan did not last long and had to be re-conquered by the Ghauri dynasty
which reinstated a Sunni rule in the region. However, years of Carmathian rule
in Multan and adjoining areas have left a deep Shia impact on the region.56
The noble gentry of the region, who generally comprised of Shias of the
Turkish, Qizilbash origin, were granted land by the British, while the local
peasants belonged to the Sunni community.57 The earliest manifestation of
political mobilisation to challenge the Shia dominion came in the 1950s when
Maulana Ghulam Hussain, a Deobandi cleric started his anti-Shia crusade by
openly criticising the political elite of Jhang and accusing them of being feudals
and Shias. This mobilisation started the usage of the sectarian card in the politics
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of Jhang, but fortunately did not gain the impetus of a large-scale sectarian
movement up until the 1980s. This is largely because of the Anti-Ahmadi
movement in Pakistan in which both Shias and Sunnis participated.58
The anti-Ahmadi campaign around Jhang played a noteworthy role in
mobilising the Sunnis of Jhang in voting for Islamist political parties. The
overwhelming success of this mobilisation was observed in the 1970 elections.
The result of the election was heavily in favour of Sunnis who won most of the
seats for the National Legislature. During this stage of the conflict, the sectarian
differences between Shias and Sunnis were forgotten after the elections, as the
foremost emphasis of all Islamists, whether the Shias or the Sunnis, was to get
the Ahmadis declared as non-Muslims. Nevertheless, a major shift in the
dimensions of the sectarian conflict in Jhang was observed in the second half of
the 1970s. In 1974 the Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims by the government
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This allowed the majority of the Sunnis to divert their
hostility to Shias, who were perceived as the new sacrilegious sect after the
assertion of Ahmadis as non-Muslims.59
Nevertheless, despite sporadic denunciations of the Shias as heretics by
Sunni preachers, till the 1980s this tension remained very limited.60 During the
1980s, the district of Jhang in Punjab emerged as the nerve centre of sectarian
conflict in Pakistan. The economy of the district was largely controlled by feudal
landlords, who were mainly Syeds (who trace their origin to Prophet Muhammad)
and Shia: the Siyals, Rajooas and Shah Jewanis apart from Chiniotis, who had
migrated from India during the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. For the
apostles of the new Sunni movement, the domination of the majority, the poor
Sunnis by the minority, the Shias was an intolerable socio-economic deformity.61
The upsurge in violent sectarian conflicts in Jhang in the 1980s and 1990s
involved assassination of senior political as well as religious leaders; injury and
murder; burning of properties and destruction of businesses were rampant.
Sectarian killings on a rampant scale actually began with the murders of Ehsan
Ellahi Zaheer in 1987 and TNFJ leader Allama Arif-ul-Hussaini in 1988. In
1990, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, himself, was killed by the Shia militants. During the
90s, Iranian officials also came under the killing spree of sectarian groups. Most
prominent was Agha Sadiq Ganji, the Iranian Consular General killed in
December, 1990 by Shaikh Haq Nawaz of Jhang. Later in 1997, another Iranian
official was killed and the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was set ablaze, by
Jhang based SSP militants.62
Vicious sectarian riots erupted in Jhang in the 1990s, further polarising the
two sects. The streets which once buzzed with Heer 63 now resounded with war
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cries. In this battle of belief, mostly the ordinary faithful fell from the both
sides. Besides being Shias and Sunnis, the deceased were doctors, teachers,
engineers, and lawyers. Other than target killing, firing and bomb blasts also
claimed many lives and did not discriminate between the mosque and the
Imambargah. The TV at home and the billboards on the roads indicated the
increased influence of religion in the lives of common people while the blast-
ripped tickers and blood-soaked newspapers pointed out that man was yet to
find eternal harmony.64
Besides the political scuffle, among various sects, there are certain practices
that the Shias follow which leads to the sectarian tension in Jhang. In the context
of Jhang both Twalla (recitation of Darood Sharif) and Tabbarra (cursing the
Ummayad Caliphs) produced a series of conflicts. Shias do perform these during
Muharram in their gatherings. The Sunnis oppose these practices and their leaders
condemn Shiite; and curse them along with their Imams. Besides, Twalla and
Tabbarra both sects have insignificant differences in other pillars of Farooh-e-
Din (practices of the religion). Besides all of these issues, there are also some
other practices, which caused conflicts in Jhang. These comprise of visiting the
shrines of Peer/Sufi etc and other stereotypes concerning Mutta (marriage for a
short or limited time period but with certain conditions) as well as the Shiite
affirmation of faith (the Kalama), all of which are very dissimilar from the
Sunni school of thought.65
Conclusions
Sectarian conflict is a real menace to the security of Pakistan. It has upset
the basic underpinning of the nation and has created disturbance, hatred, violence,
and disorder in the society there. Since the last few decades, sectarian conflicts
have amplified assassinations, suicide bombings, bomb blasts, and terrorist
attacks. Thus, Pakistan has an immediate threat from sectarian strife, along
with the above mentioned other disorders.
It can be rightly put into writing that the common man in Pakistan is living
in fear for his and his family’s life. The sectarian violence is causing terror in all
segments of the society, like government employees, students, journalists, traders
etc. In some places, as mentioned above, even the daily activities are hampered.
People are in constant fear of doing daily mundane chores like going to market
places, travelling in public transport or even visiting places of religious worship.
The threat comes more severely from the legal environment of the country,
in which violent groups, militants and criminals freely operate due to a lack of
threat of punishment from some law enforcing agency. As a result, the sectarian
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groups along with other gangs and outfits enjoy absolute impunity and
accordingly proliferate freely, without much obstruction or danger.
The militant groups are working to create anarchy and unrest in the country.
They mostly want to trigger a reaction and gain political mileage. The tragic
reality for the entire nation of Pakistan is the killing of fellow Muslims by one
another, that too, in the name of religion.
Also, more tragic is the level of impunity exercised by such elements in
their functioning within the social, religious and political framework of Pakistan.
Those committing such sectarian crimes are mostly getting away with a series
of murders.
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